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Summary
In this paper the author argues that the Europeanization and transition of post-
communist countries are one and the same process. In his opinion the transi-
tion is essentially – Europeanization. In South-Eastern Europe this causes a 
political shift from the nationalist forces to the pro-European forces. The col-
lapse of former Yugoslavia caused a slowdown of Europeanization; however, 
if the newly formed nation-states want to prosper and if the European Union 
wants security and stability on the continent, the process of Europeanization 
has to be successfully completed.
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In all post-communist countries, the political and economic transitions and the ac-
ceptance of the rules and conditions pertaining to their accession to the EU have vir-
tually been substantially overlapping processes. The Europeanization and transition 
have been essentially one and the same process – the former, with its requirements, 
has significantly helped and facilitated the latter. It has all boiled down to the adop-
tion of EU requirements and regulations. Technically, this has implied downloading 
the relevant laws, policies and practices with very limited possibilities for reserving 
opt-outs corresponding to the special interests of new member states (Bulmer and 
Lequesne, 2005: 259-262).
In the countries that have emerged from the former Yugoslavia, because of 
their war legacy and implications of the disintegration of the multinational federa-
tion, the European Union itself has imposed a third set of requirements: political 
stabilisation. For the Western Balkans, the EU has devised a new type of accession 
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treaty: Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), which stipulate only the 
possibility of acquiring the status of a full EU member.1 This new type of agree-
ment has introduced for the region a policy of conditionality for the admission to 
the EU. These conditions have often been general and unspecified – they have been 
interpreted by the EU. They have proven to be moving targets. One difficulty also 
lies in the fact that, over time, the EU has added new policy areas: home affairs, 
justice, the Schengen area, a common foreign and security policy, and a common 
currency (cf. Grabbe, 2003: 254-256). Another change is related to the fact that 
new potential members can no longer have opt-outs from a part of the regulation in 
the field of monetary union, the Schengen area, security and defence policy – the 
possibility previously used by old members such as Britain, Ireland and Denmark 
(ibid.: 257).
For the new members, the EU has specified the most important set that has 
defined the policy of conditionality. It comprises primarily the so-called Copenha-
gen criteria of 1993, which include: stability of institutions guaranteeing democ-
racy, rule of law, human rights protection, protection of minorities, a functioning 
and, within the EU, competitive market economy. The 1995 Madrid criteria added 
new requirements for those aspiring to EU membership. They required that future 
member countries provide for the administrative and legal capacity for the imple-
mentation of, and respect for, EU regulations – the acquis communautaire. The re-
quirements are, of course, reasonable, but they still leave open the problem of the 
obligation of adjustment being imposed on economically underdeveloped countries 
burdened with a multitude of difficulties in their transition and development, of 
both economic and political nature (cf. Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 582). And last 
but not least, following the decision by the European Council in Salonika of 2003, 
the EU has committed itself to the gradual integration of the Western Balkan coun-
tries into the Union – but without precise time limits. Even though the criteria, to-
gether with an increase in the number of EU legislative regulations that should be 
adopted, amplified by some additional requirements, have been set very high, and 
although the commitments that the South-Eastern European countries would be ad-
mitted to the EU have been loosely defined, the prospects of European integration 
have had a very strong impact on the balance of political forces in the region.
An irreversible political shift occurred in all countries in the region. The nation-
alist forces had to hand the leadership over to the pro-European forces – regardless 
1 “The ‘Western Balkans’ of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Yu-
goslavia, for which the EU has devised the special instrument of Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements (SAAs). The SAAs offer trade access, political dialogue and cooperation in many 
areas – like the Europe Agreements signed with the accession candidates – but the SAAs mention 
only the possibility of evolving towards full candidate status”. Cf. Grabbe, 2003: 260-261.
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of the differences between countries and despite the fact that the lead of the demo-
cratic and pro-European forces had often been established with a narrow win.
With the transformation of the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokrat-
ska zajednica – HDZ), all Croatian parliamentary parties adopted the inclusion in-
to the Euro-Atlantic integration as their political objective. In June 2006, the EU 
opened up accession negotiations with Croatia (that got stuck because of the deci-
sion that the Protected Ecological Fishery Zone [Zaštićeni ekološko-ribolovni pojas 
– ZERP] would be introduced on 1 January 2008 and, later, because of the Slove-
nian blockade and problems with the Hague Tribunal and the Chapter on Justice). 
In Serbia, following Tadić’s victory in the 2008 presidential elections and the vic-
tory by the “For a European Serbia” alliance (Blok za evropsku Srbiju) in the par-
liamentary elections, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was ratified in 
mid-2008. In 2005, Macedonia was recognized candidate status with no decision 
as to when negotiations would be launched. While Macedonia does face economic 
difficulties, delicate interethnic relations and the Greek blockade, this breakthrough 
is by no means to be underestimated. Montenegro signed its Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreement in 2007. Kosovo was included in the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Process (SAP) in 2002. Thereby, Kosovo was not freed from economic under-
development and difficult relations with Serbia, but nonetheless obtained a certain 
European perspective. Only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its complex political 
system and antagonistic ethnic relations, political consolidation remains a prelimi-
nary question before its accession to the EU.
Integration into the EU implies benefits that have already become typical for 
new members. EU membership ensures market expansion and legal certainty, and 
minimises the risk for potential investors, which generates significant capital in-
flow and the growth of less-developed countries – this was exemplified by Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland. These are some of the general reasons in favour of the earliest 
possible admission of the South-Eastern European countries into the EU.2 On the 
other hand, stalling and postponing the admission until the countries in the region 
completely, without exception, meet all criteria, can only marginalise non-member 
states and provoke adverse responses that can inflict damage not only on them, but 
on other countries on the continent as well.
What is important for Croatia is that its adjustment to EU regulations includes 
the reform and modernisation of its legal system. Without judicial reform, the func-
tioning of the market economy will not be possible. This reform would be long-last-
2 Such a thesis is quite firmly advocated by the authors of one of the most ambitious books on 
transition problems in the region – Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 589. They suggest that the ad-
mission of this group of transitional countries should be completed “as soon as feasible, without 
waiting for them fully to ‘put their own houses in order’ before entry”.
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ing and problematic if there were no requirements as to the acceptance of the entire 
EU legal legacy. The EU is in fact a supranational legal order negotiated between 
the member states. Essentially, the EU “is the rule of law – nothing more, nothing 
less” (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 584).
Croatia has a very sensitive minority issue. In addition, the national question 
has been extremely pronounced even in the relations between the newly established 
states – the Federal Republics and Autonomous Provinces of the former Yugoslav 
federal state. Within the new countries, new minorities have emerged – parts of eth-
nic communities that now have their own nation-states in neighbouring countries. 
Besides, the former borders between federal units have become borders between 
sovereign states and they have not always proven to be uncontested. The war and 
attempts of territorial expansion at the expense of neighbouring countries have fur-
ther intensified tensions between nationalities. The emergence of the new sovereign 
states marked the completion of the process of national build-up, which in itself 
strikingly highlighted the role of the national question – much more so than in old 
European nations.
The European Union has a broader political framework than nation-states and 
thus creates a situation in which no national community can impose its own interest 
or be permanently unprivileged. This creates a positive environment for resolving 
conflicting ethnic interests more easily in the Union’s member nation-states. This 
broader political framework, of course, is effective only once countries have joined 
the EU as full members. In his time, Thomas Mann said that the Europeanization of 
Germany was the best protection against the Germanization of Europe. Similarly, 
it could be said today regarding the South-Eastern European region that the Euro-
peanization of the Balkans provides the best protection against the Balkanization 
of Europe. Here the term “Balkanization” does not mean the fragmentation of na-
tion-states, but the entanglement of South-Eastern European countries in retrograde 
processes and unsolved problems. The EU member states should care, for instance, 
whether the area of former Yugoslavia has been definitely pacified, normalised and 
integrated into the EU, or else remains a permanent source of economic, political 
and security problems with smouldering ethnic conflicts, at times tense interstate 
relations and porous borders for organised crime.
As a consequence of the collapse of the former federation and the wars during 
the 1990s, the economic and regional collaboration in the region is still far below its 
potential. The intra-regional collaboration will probably not, and does not have to, 
rise to the level that was present during the existence of the former Yugoslav fede-
ration, but there can neither be any doubt that there is a strong unused potential for 
primarily economic cooperation that can serve the interests of all parties involved. 
In this cooperation, the economically more developed countries, such as Croatia 
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and Slovenia, certainly have an advantage. Joining the EU, like the accession pro-
cess itself, facilitates regional collaboration, because it removes obstacles in the 
normalisation of relations and economic cooperation. Again, an advance on this 
level can be much more easily achieved among full EU members than among those 
that have not yet progressed to full membership.
In spite of deficits in some fields, it should be noted that there are also some 
advantages in the region that facilitate its integration into the Union. Prior to the 
1990s, the former Yugoslav federation had a limited market economy, and the levels 
of economic development and living standards were higher than those in the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries, which belonged to what used to be the Soviet 
Bloc. Furthermore, within Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia (and Voivodina) were 
economically and institutionally the most developed units of the federation. If Yu-
goslavia had not collapsed, it would probably have been the first post-communist 
country to join the EU. After all, such an offer was indeed made to Ante Marković’s 
government.3 The rapid disintegration of the Yugoslav federation made the ques-
tion of accessing the then European Community irrelevant. The fact that the reform-
ist communist elites in Croatia and Slovenia endorsed the idea of joining the EU in 
a joint declaration proposed at the last, 14th Communist Party Congress in January 
1990 is much less known.
In the 1990s wars, a part of the economic advantages based on the existence 
of a limited market economy and relative democratisation, which distinguished the 
country from other communist states, melted away, but up to this day the units 
of the former Yugoslav federation have maintained some economic indicators that 
are still better than those in some of the new EU member states. In 1990, GDP per 
capita was $ 8706 in Slovenia, $ 5106 in Croatia, and $ 1300 in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania. In 2007, GDP per capita, when converted by the purchasing power parity, 
was $ 27,205 in Slovenia, $ 15,549 in Croatia, $ 11,302 in Bulgaria, and $ 11,387 in 
Romania. The estimation of the GDP level is not entirely reliable, because in some 
3 In May 1991, a delegation of the European Community, including Jacques Delors, President 
of the European Commission, and Jacques Santer, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister, offered the 
Federal Government in Belgrade assistance, which also included the signing of an Association 
Agreement, provided that the country remained united and accepted some other conditions for 
arranging the state required by the EC. In addition, on 24 June 1991, one day before Croatia 
and Slovenia proclaimed independence, the EU co-signed an agreement with the Federal Go-
vernment in Belgrade on a five-year loan in the amount of ECU 807 million, which proved that 
European leaders did not at all realise what was actually happening in the Yugoslav federation. 
Much like the federal Prime Minister, they deemed that the country could be held together by 
financial support. Such an approach was recognised as support to the policy of recentralisation 
of Yugoslavia by advocates of the communist hard-line and Milošević (cf. Cviić and Sanfey, 
2008: 91-92).
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countries of the former Soviet Bloc there is still an influence of the Soviet statistics, 
which has whitewashed the economic achievements of the ruling elite. It is very 
likely that, even today, the economic indicators of some EU members are still lag-
ging behind not only those of Slovenia, but those of Croatia as well. It should be 
added here that, as a consequence of the war, the share of the black economy in the 
region is, from a comparative perspective, disproportionally large: estimates vary 
from 18 percent up to one third of the GDP.
There is little argument about the fact that some of the new members have 
found themselves in the fast lane of accession to the EU for international political 
reasons – particularly those on the eastern side of the continent that seal off the area 
against Russia. This fact, as well as the estimation that some of the new members 
have fared worse than Croatia, not only in terms of their economic indicators, cau-
ses a sense among the citizens that the country has waited unjustifiably long to be 
admitted to the EU. Such sentiment has reinforced Euroscepticism, given support to 
the nationalist arguments about the EU posing a threat to sovereignty, and built up 
the political extremism of rightist radicals and ultra-leftists who have opposed Eu-
ropean integration, democratic and market reforms and the opening of their respec-
tive countries to the world and regional collaboration. This can all lead to a down-
shift in economic transition and threaten democratic consolidation. The point here 
is not only that the domestic opposition to reforms will be increasingly difficult to 
overcome, but also that potential foreign investors will be discouraged.
The delay in obtaining the full membership status has led to some further prob-
lems. In time, the EU regulations – the acquis communautaire – that must be adopt-
ed and implemented will become increasingly extensive. The status of a non-mem-
ber country has only adverse political implications: problems will only become 
aggravated. No less important is the fact that the countries left outside the EU will 
remain isolated and marginalised at the edge of the “Fortress Europe”. This is not 
limited to the visa issuing policy and the Schengen control.4
Among all South-Eastern European countries, Croatia is now closest to joining 
the EU. If it will not be able to join the Union in the foreseeable future, the pros-
pects of other countries will become dramatically narrower. Especially when we 
take into account the fact that each country in the region is burdened by very serious 
problems, which, in the case of their aggravation, will pose a threat by retrograde 
solutions. Bosnia and Herzegovina has serious difficulties with the functioning of 
its political system and relations among its nationalities. In Serbia, the victory of 
pro-European forces was won by a narrow margin. Macedonia is held back by the 
4 In addition, Grabbe emphasizes that even the additional funding is directed mainly towards 
members and accession candidates (Grabbe, 2003: 265-266).
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Greek blockade. In Montenegro, the victory of independence forces was very tight. 
Kosovo has not yet solved its minority issue, and its relations with Serbia are still 
very problematic. All countries in the region are facing domestic economic difficul-
ties and consequences of the global recession. It will take a couple more years for 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo to exceed 
the 1989 economic level! All of the above makes the situation in the region ex-
tremely fragile. The adverse domino effect does not pose an immediate threat, but 
can by no means be excluded.
Basically, there are two possible solutions regarding the admission of post-
communist countries into the EU – especially of the South-Eastern European re-
gion. The first one, which requires of the accession candidates to put their own 
houses in order and complete their economic and political transition prior to admis-
sion, is in accordance with EU principles and is particularly relevant for the credi-
bility of EU institutions. The assumption of the second solution is that the quick-
est way of bringing the post-communist states into order is the completion of their 
transition and democratic consolidation and their admission into the EU as soon as 
feasible. The idea of this argument is to admit the candidates into full membership 
as soon as possible. Such a dilemma also existed in the Kosovo case: should the 
criteria be met first and then independence proclaimed or, conversely, should inde-
pendence be recognised first, which would then make the fulfilment of the criteria 
possible? The Ahtisaari Plan eventually accepted the second solution as the best one 
for Kosovo.5
There is no denying the fact that there are indeed some risks involved in the 
premature admission of the countries that have not fully met the criteria for join-
ing the EU and solved their old problems or carried out all necessary economic and 
political reforms. However, these costs and risks will be higher if the states are left 
to boil in their own sauce until they have fully met the admission criteria. This is 
applicable not only to the situation in the countries that are potential candidates for 
accession to the EU. Not even Western Europe will successfully resist the problems 
arising from South-Eastern Europe if the region is not included in European integra-
tion as soon as possible. Instead of immigration restrictions, or intensified measures 
for the defence against organised crime, a simpler solution, for instance, would be 
to change the situation in the region through its quicker inclusion in EU integrative 
structures.
5 Bideleux and Jeffries add to this: “Nevertheless, this must not be allowed to obscure the im-
portant (albeit paradoxical) fact that the post-communist Balkan states can best be assisted to 
put their houses more fully in order by admitting them to the EU and its stringent rules and dis-
ciplines, which is a strong argument for admitting them sooner rather than later” (Bideleux and 
Jeffries, 2007: 581).
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Western Europe should not repeat its mistake of the 1990s, when it aggravated 
the situation in the region and produced problems to itself by misjudgements and 
belated responses – in the beginning, it did not know how to stop the conflicts and 
a decisive reaction followed only later by its participation in stopping the war and 
by minimising the effects of material and humanitarian disaster. The arms embargo 
virtually encouraged the aggression and left the victims without protection; the eco-
nomic sanctions obstructed the economy, but did serve Milošević as a justification 
for the argument about the world’s conspiracy against Serbia, and as a formal cover 
for the West to postpone the intervention which was eventually unavoidable. The 
Hague trials asserted the thesis that the crimes would not be unpunished, but their 
lengthiness and frequent ultimatums have long been giving material to the national-
ist forces for their survival on our political scene.
Admittedly, the West – the United States in particular – significantly contribu-
ted to the cessation of the war, renewing and reviving regional initiatives. To men-
tion only a few of the initiatives which have produced better or weaker results: first, 
the South-Eastern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) sponsored by the US 
should by no means be left out here; it was launched in 1996, and was applying to 
economic cooperation; second, the South-Eastern European Cooperation Process 
(SEECP), which was launched in 2000 and, apart from the so-called Western Bal-
kans, included Albania, Greece, Moldova, Romania and Turkey; it covered three 
fields: security, economy and culture; third, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Eu-
rope (PS), which was launched in 1999 by Germany under the auspices of the OESS 
and with the support of the EU, and included, along with the Western Balkans, Al-
bania, Romania and Moldova, with three working tables: democracy, economy and 
security (the coordinator being Erhard Busek; the Pact was extinguished on 30 June 
2008); and, fourth, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), which was estab-
lished in 2006 and based in Sarajevo (Cviić and Sanfey, 2008: 111-112).
Finally, the countries in the region were offered the prospect of joining Euro-
Atlantic integration processes. However, slow decision-making and postponing de-
cisions are still present – remember, for example, Solana’s insistence on the survival 
of the state community of Serbia and Montenegro (in Belgrade, this state used to be 
ironically called “Solania”), which could not function properly from the very begin-
ning. However, it provided the EU with an alibi that something was being done.
The interests of Europe, Russia and the United States are still interlaced in the 
region. These interests are economic, but also political in nature – the interest in 
political stability which will also ensure the stability of the continent. What is posi-
tive is the fact that all countries in the region today consider their admission to the 
EU their primary foreign policy objective. Croatia is faced with the problem of its 
accession being blocked. For Slovenia, a border dispute has become above all a 
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domestic issue – which makes any flexible approach to resolving the dispute even 
more difficult. This is rather similar, albeit not the same, in Croatia. Croatia accepts 
that the dispute should be resolved as a foreign policy issue through international 
arbitration and the application of international law. The EU institutional arrange-
ments require decisions on EU membership to be made consensually. This is in fact 
a confederate approach. The only problem with the confederate principle is that, as 
a rule, all confederations have either disintegrated or transformed into federations. 
The confederate principle has survived only in very large international organisa-
tions that do not make politically crucial decisions. The consequence for the EU 
is obviously the need for change in decision-making – because the blockade of the 
enlargement calls into question the fundamental principles upon which the EU has 
been founded – the European unity and openness of the Union. Of course, Croatia 
has got another problem – the assessment of the collaboration with the Hague Tri-
bunal, corruption and judicial reform. Now, it can be said that Croatia is faced with 
the fact that the foreign policy capacity of the EU is limited in terms of both its in-
stitutions and vested interests. The policy of the new US administration seems en-
couraging, because it again shows, like in the 1990s, that the region is not outside 
its focus. This is suggested by the recent visit of Vice-President Joseph Biden to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo. Whether the new US policy will af-
fect the European foreign policies is yet to be seen.6
Interestingly, when it comes to the region, the saying created on the occasion of 
the 1914 assassination in Sarajevo, which was the immediate cause of World War I, 
still holds true: “The Balkans produce more history than they can consume locally”. 
Obviously, others must also deal with the problems emerging with this surplus of 
history. The region, as seen today, is not exclusively a European problem, but its 
pacification and normalisation require incentives from global political powers as 
well.
6 Last autumn, after a presentation at an academic conference, it became clear that the new US 
administration did get involved in solving the Croatian-Slovenian border dispute, as well as in an 
attempt to move the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina away from the deadlock.
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